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The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for PreDaration of FMEA and CIL, 10 octobe_ 1986.
The iOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power
Distribution and Control (EPD&C) hardware, generating draft
failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve
independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance
upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL
documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA
FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A
resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided
through additional analysis as required. This report documents
the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD&C hardware.
The IOA product for the EPD&C analysis consisted of one thousand
six hundred and seventy-one (1671) failure mode analysis
"worksheets" that resulted in four hundred and sixty-eight (468)
potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline (as of 31 December 1987)
which consisted of four hundred and thirty-five (435) FMEAs and
one hundred and fifty-eight (158) CIL items. Differences between
the number of IOA worksheets and--NASA FMEAs resulted from
different levels of analysis (e.g. grouping components into one
FMEA versus a worksheet for each component), failure modes not
being identified within the original analysis, and the fact that
two different schematic sets were used (NASA used Rockwell
International assembly drawings and IOA used the Rockwell
International integrated schematics). Figure 1 presents a
comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA
recommended baseline.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA
interpretation of the FMEA/CIL preparation instructions,
definitions of screen detectability, and some ignorance of flight
procedures on the part of IOA. After comparison, there were no
discrepancies found that were not already identified by NASA, and
the remaining issues are the result of the differences in the
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The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizin_ as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
m
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions




































3.1 Design and Function
The EPD&C subsystem starts at the outputs of the three fuel cells
in the EPG subsystem and ends at the using subsystems. DC power
from each fuel cell is routed through two wires to one of three
main and one of three essential busses. Each main bus can be
tied to either of the other two main busses through power
contactors and each essential bus is also connected to the other
two main busses through diodes and Remote Power Controllers
(RPCs). Nine control busses are connected to the three main
busses through diodes and RPCs with each control bus receiving
power from two main busses. A control bus can be connected to
the remaining main bus when the appropriate circuit breaker is
closed. Each one ofthreeOrbital Maneuvering Subsystem/Reaction
Control Subsystem (OMS/RCS) DC busses are powered by two of three
main busses through RPCs and diodes. Three DC busses to the
payload (Payload Cabin, Payload AUX, and Payload Emergency
busses) are powered through RPCs and diodes from Main DC busses A
and B. Larger payload DC loads are powered through power
contactors from Main DC busses B and C and Fuel Cell #3.
AC power is generated by connecting each main DC bus to three of
nine single-phase invertors, resulting in three three-phase AC
busses. The three AC busses are connected to various loads
through circuit breakers. These AC busses are further connected
to three RCS/OMS AC busses, three Payload Bay Door (PLBD) AC
busses, and three Payload Bay Mechanical (PLBM) AC busses.
3.2 Assemblies Description
The EPD&C hardware performs the functions of distributing,
sensing, and controlling DC power and inverting, distributing,
sensing, and controlling AC power throughout the Orbiter. The
EPD&C subsystem is broken down and described by the following
fourteen assembly types:
I. Three (3) Main DC Distribution Assemblies (MDDAs) connect
the fuel cell outputs through power contactors to the three
main DC busses and through diodes and fuses via Panel RIAI
to the three essential busses. Power contactors on the
MDDAs allow tying the main busses together. Bus voltage and
current levels can be measured directly on Panel F9A2 meters
or observed indirectly via General Purpose Computer (GPC)
output display via signal conditioners and
Multiplexer/Demultiplexers (MDMs). Main and essential DC













Three (3) Mid Power Control Assemblies (MPCAs) contain RPCs
to connect main DC bus power to MMCAs, Payload busses
(Cabin, Aux, and Emergency), and to essential busses. There
are also RPCs which connect Pre-FlightTest Busses to MDDAs
which allow Ground Support Equipment (GSE) control and
monitor of fuel cells and main DC bus ties.
Four (4) Mid Motor Control Assemblies (_CAs) contain relays
to connect the three PLBM and three PLBD AC busses to the
three main AC busses. DC power is also routed to the
Payload Bay motors and relays.
Three (3) Aft Power Control Assemblies (APCA-4, APCA-5, and
APCA-6) contain RPCs that connect power to the three RCS/OMS
DC busses, AMCAs, essential busses, and control GSE power to
the MMDAs. GSE power is d_strlbuted from these assemblies
through power contactors. DC power is also routed through
fused connections to the ALCAs and the other three APCAs.
Three (3) Aft Power Control Assemblies (APCA-I, APCA-2, and
APCA-3) contain RPCs that power Master Event Controllers #I
and #2. Fused DC power to the Payload Bay is routed through
these assemblies also.
Three (3) Aft Load Control Assemblies (ALCAs) connect Main
DC Bus power to various subsystems. They also contain
Hybrid Device Controllers to connect GSE power to the
essential busses.
Three (3) Aft Motor Control Assemblies (AMCAs) connect Main
DC Bus power through diodes to the three RCS/OMS DC busses.
They also contain the origin of the RCS/OMS AC busses.
Three (3) Forward Power Control Assemblies (FPCAs) contain
the circuitry to connect the three main DC busses to the
nine control busses. DC power is provided to the AC
inverters through fuses and latching relays, RPCs are used
to control DC power to FMCAs and fused DC power is provided
to the FLCAs.
Three (3) Forward Load Control Assemblies (FLCAs) contain
Hybrid Device Controllers t g_9ontrol the nine ACinverters
and to allow GSE control of the same inverters2
i0. Three (3) Forward Motor Control Assemblies (FMCAs) route AC
and DC power to various subsystems.
ii. Three (3) AC Generation & Distribution Assemblies (AGDAs)
provide control and power circuits to the nine AC inverters.
Over/under voltage sensors allow inverters to be monitored





















u12. The Flight Deck Panel Controls and Displays (FDPC&D) perform
the switching and certain monitoring functions for the
routing of power to all subsystems. These panels include
L4, RI3, RI5, RI, R2, 013, 014, 015, 016, 017, 019, F9, FI,
F6, C3, All, AI2, AI5, and A6.
13. The Mid Deck Panel Controls and Displays (MDPC&D) perform
the switching and monitoring functions for power to the
inverters and various subsystems. These panels include
M030F, M052J, M013Q, and MA73C.
14. The Master Event Controllers #I and #2, certain channels in
the Annunciator Control Assemblies, and Current Sensors are
grouped in this last category for convenience.
3.3 Hierarchy
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The IOA analysis of the EPD&C hardware initially generated one
thousand six hundred and seventy-one (1671) failure mode analysis
worksheets and identified four hundred and sixty-eight (468)
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process. In order to facilitate comparison, one hundred and
eighty-four (184) additional failure mode analysis worksheets
were generated. These analysis results were compared to the
proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of four hundred and thirty-five
(435) FMEAs and one hundred and fifty-eight (158) CIL items, as
of 31 December 1987. Differences between the number of IOA
worksheets and NASA FMEAs resulted from different levels of
analysis (e.g. grouping components into one FMEAversus a
worksheet for each component), failure modes not being identified
within the original analysis, and that two different schematic
sets were used (NASA used Rockwell International assembly
drawings and IOA used the Rockwell International Integrated
Schematics).
Table I presents a summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs
assessed, versus the recommended IOA baseline, and any issues
identified. The unmapped IOA column is the raw number of IOA
failure modes. The mapped IOA column is the number of IOA
failure modes after they have been mapped onto the NASA FMEAs.
The issues column is the IOA failure modes that were unable to be
mapped onto NASA FMEAs.
Table II presents a summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items
assessed, versus the recommended I0A baseline, and any issues
identified.
Tables III and IV present a summary of the IOA recommended
failure criticalities and critical items for the Post 51-L FMEA
baseline, respectively. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes and critical items
is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
Table V presents the scheme for assigning IOA assessment and
analysis worksheet numbers.
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode. Appendix D presents the NASA Critical Items and
corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix E contains IOA analysis
worksheets supplementing previous analysis results reported in
Space Transportation System Engineering and Operations Support
(STSEOS) Working Paper No. 1.0-WP-VA86001-28, Analysis of the
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsytem, 3, April
1987. Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA






































































































































































NOTES: (I) These two subsystems share three (3) FMEAs/CILs.
(2) NASA deleted one (I) FMEA that IOA had not.
(3) This subsystem has two (2) FMEAs/CILs that NASA
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TABLE V IOA Worksheet Numbers
mm_
IOA ID Number
5010-5030, 5059-5065, 5085-5088, 5100, 5101, 5104, 5105,
5129-5155, 5190-5196, 5208-5211, 5232, 5233, 5242-5244,
5312-5317, 5320-5339, 5350-5366, 5395-5402, 5422-5424,
5436-5440, 5477-5497, 5542-5561, 5592-5611, 6683X-6686X
5031-5046, 5102, 5103, 5117, 5118, 5156-5171, 5234-5241,
5264-5305, 5379-5394, 5441-5444, 5461-5476, 5526-5541,
5630-5645, 5648, 5649, 5653-5655, 6671X
5980-5995, 6156-6175, 6336-6351, 6676X-6679X, 6707X,
6708X
5000-5009, 5106-5108, 5112, 5113, 5119-5128, 5245-5247,
5251, 5252, 5340-5349, 5445-5447, 5451, 5452, 5498-5505,
5512, 5513, 5565-5572, 5576, 5577, 5586, 5587, 5614-5621
5646, 5647, 5656-5658, 6709X, 6710X
5186-5189, 5375-5378, 6360-6369, 6554-6557, 6562-6573,
6578-6609, 6622-6629
5506, 5507, 5563, 5564, 5612, 5613, 6530-6553, 6558-6561
6658-6662
5514-5517, 5578-5585, 6680X-6682X
5089-5096, 5212-5219, 5425-5429, 5508, 5562, 5591,
5650-5652, 5686-5713, 5732-5787, 5861-5884, 6032-6061,
6212-6241, 6380-6385, 6691X
5659-5676, 5714-5731, 5839-5860, 5899-5904, 6004-6031,
6074-6079, 6184-6211, 6254-6257, 6386-6465, 6697X, 6698X
6673X-6675X
5885-5896, 5905-5930, 5935-5958, 6062-6073, 6086-6135,
6242-6253, 6264-6313, 6492-6500, 6687X, 6688X
5047-5058, 5066-5071, 5074-5081, 5172-5185, 5197-5200,
5203, 5204, 5253-5263, 5306-5311, 5318, 5319, 5367-5374,
5403-5414, 5417, 5418, 5453-5460, 5518-5525, 5622-5629,
5677-5685, 5788-5838, 5897, 5898, 5931-5934, 5959, 5962-
5965, 5996-6003, 6080-6085, 6176-6183, 6258-6263, 6314,
6315, 6318, 6319, 6352-6359, 6370-6379, 6466-6491, 6574-






























Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers (continued) )
IOA ID Number I
5072, 5073, 5082-5084, 5097-5099, 5109-5111, 5114-5116
5201, 5202, 5205-5207, 5220-5231, 5248-5250, 5415,
5416, 5419-5421, 5430-5435, 5448-5450, 5509-5511,
5573-5575, 5588-5590, 5960, 5961, 5966-5979,6136-6155,
6316, 6317, 6320-6335, 6512-6529
6501-6511, 6642, 6643, 6645, 6646, 6663-6670, 6689X,
6699X-6702X
4.1 Assessment Results - Main DC Distribution Assemblies
The IOA analysis of the Main DC Distribution Assemblies generated
one hundred and ninety-nine (199) failure mode worksheets and
identified one hundred and six (106) Potential Critical Items
(PCis) before starting the assessment. During the assessment, an
additional thirteen (13) failure mode worksheets were generated.
The two hundred and twelve (212) IOA worksheets map into fifty-
seven (57) NASA FMEAs of which twenty-seven (27) are CILs. Of
the NASA FMEAs, three (3) are criticality 1/1, thirteen (13) are
criticality 2/1R, one (1) is criticality 2/2, twenty-five (25)
are criticality 3/1R, and fifteen (15) are criticality 3/3. IOA
has four (4) worksheets, all criticality 3/3, that do not map
into NASA FMEAs. However, these components are test points on
the assemblies and in the current configuration are non-critical.
IOA recommends no action on them until they are actually used in
a flight circuit. Three (3) NASA _A/CILs (05-6-2008A-1, 05-6-
2008B-I, and 05-6-2008C-1) contain components that are also on
the Aft Power Control Assemblies as noted in Tables I and II.
IOA has one (1) additional worksheet that maps into a FMEA that
NASA deleted. The IOA has no issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL
reevaluation for these assemblies.
4.2 Assessment Results - Mid Power Control Assemblies
The IOA analysis of the Mid Power Control Assemblies generated
one hundred and fifty-nine (159) failure mode worksheets and
identified twenty-one (21) PCIs before starting the assessment.
During the assessment, an additional thirteen (13) failure mode
worksheets were generated. The one hundred and seventy-two (172)
IOA worksheets map into forty-four (44) NASA FMEAs of which six
(6) are CILs. Of the NASA FMEAs, three (3) are criticality 2/IR,
seventeen (17) are criticality 3/IR, three (3) are criticality
3/2R, and twenty-one (21) are criticality 3/3. The IOA has no




4.3 Assessment Results - Mid Motor Control Assemblies
The IOA analysis of the Mid Motor Control Assemblies generated
fifty-two (52) failure mode worksheets and identified forty (40)
PCIs before starting the assessment. During the assessment, an
additional twenty (20) failure mode worksheets were generated.
The seventy-two (72) IOA worksheets map into twenty-eight (28)
NASA FMEAs of which sixteen (16) are CILs. Of the NASA FMEAs,
fifteen (15) are criticality 2/IR, eight (8) are criticality
3/IR, and five (5) are criticality 3/3. Twenty-four (24) of the
original IOA analysis worksheets map into two (2) NASA FMEA/CILs
(05-6EB-2004-I, and -2) that NASA covers in the Payload Bay
Doors/EPD&C Subsystem as noted in Tables I and II. The IOA has
no issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL reevaluation for these
assemblies.
4.4 Assessment Results - Aft Power Control Assemblies 4, 5, & 6
The IOA analysis of the Aft Power Control Assemblies 4, 5, and 6
generated eighty (80) failure mode worksheets and identified
twenty-one (21) PCIs before starting the assessment. During the
assessment, an additional eight (8) failure mode worksheets were
generated. The eighty-eight (88) IOA worksheets map into thirty
(30) NASA FMEAs of which twelve (12) are CILs. Of the NASA
FMEAs, one (i) is identified as criticality i/i, two (2) are
criticality 2/IR, thirteen (13) are criticality 3/IR, and
fourteen (14) are criticality 3/3. Three (3) NASA FMEA/CILs (05-
6-2008A-I, 05-6-2008B-I, and 05-6-2008C-I) contain components
that are also on the Main DC Distribution Assemblies as noted in
Tables I and II. The IOA has no issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL
reevaluation for these assemblies.
4.5 Assessment Results - Aft Power Control Assemblies i, 2, & 3
The IOA analysis of the Aft Power Control Assemblies i, 2, and 3
generated seventy-four (74) failure mode worksheets and
identified twenty-six (26) PCIs before starting the assessment.
During the assessment, an additional twelve (12) failure mode
worksheets were generated. The eighty-six (86) IOA worksheets
map into sixteen (16) NASA FMEAs of which five (5) are CILs. Of
the NASA FMEAs, two (2) are criticality 2/1R, six (6) are
criticality 3/1R, two (2) are criticality 3/2R, and six (6) are
criticality 3/3. The IOA has eight (8) criticality 3/1R non-PCI
and sixteen (16) criticality 3/3 worksheets that do not map into
NASA FMEAs. The NASA EPD&C Subsystem Manager was not sure
whether these components were already reevaluated. The
discrepancy is the result of NASA using the Rockwell
International assembly drawings and the IOA using the Rockwell
International integrated schematics. IOA recommends that these
components be added to the FMEA/CIL process, unless they are



















4.6 Assessment Results - Aft Load Control Assemblies
The IOA analysis of the Aft Load Control Assemblies generated
thirty-nine (39) failure mode worksheets and identified fourteen
(14) PCIs before starting the assessment. During the assessment,
an additional four (4) failure mode worksheets were generated.
The forty-three (43) IOA worksheets map into twelve (12) NASA
FMEAs of which six (6) are CILs. Of the NASA FMEAs, two (2) are
criticality i/I, one (I) is criticality 2/IR, eight (8) are
criticality 3/IR, and one (i) is criticality 3/3. The IOA has no
issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL reevaluation for these assemblies.
4.7 Assessment Results - Aft Motor Control Assemblies
The IOA analysis of the Aft Motor Control Assemblies generated
twelve (12) failure mode w0rksheets and identified twelve (12)
PCIs before starting the assessment. During the assessment, an
additional nine (9) failure mode worksheets were generated. The
twenty-one (21) IOA worksheets map into six (6) NASA FMEAs of
which three (3) are CILs. Of the NASA FMEAs, three (3) are
criticality 3/IR and three are criticality 3/3. The IOA has no
issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL reevaluation for these assemblies.
4.8 Assessment Results - Forward Power Control Assemblies
The IOA analysis of the Forward Power Control Assemblies
generated two hundred and one (201) failure mode worksheets and
identified fifty-seven (57) PCIs before starting the assessment.
During the assessment, an additional nineteen (19) failure mode
worksheets were generated. The two hundred and twenty (220) IOA
worksheets map into twenty-four (24) NASA FMEAs of which seven
(7) are CILs. Of the NASA FMEAs, one (1) is criticality 1/1,
three (3) are criticality 2/1R, eight (8) are criticality 3/1R,
and twelve (12) are criticality 3/3. The IOA has six (6)
criticality 3/3 worksheets that do not map into NASA FMEAs.
However, these components are test points on the assemblies and
in the current configuration are non-critical. IOA recommends no
action on them until they are actually used in a flight circuit.
The IOA has no issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL reevaluation for
these assemblies.
4.9 Assessment Results -F0rward Load control Assemblies
The IOA analysis of the Forward Load Control Assemblies generated
two hundred and ten (210) failure mode worksheets and identified
nine (9) PCIs before starting the assessment. During the
assessment, two (2) additional failure mode worksheets were
generated. The two hundred and twelve (212) IOA worksheets map
into thirty-two (32) NASA FMEAs of which seven (7) are CILs. Of
the NASA FMEAs, one (1) is criticality 1/1, one (1) is
criticality 2/1R, fourteen (14) are criticality 3/1R, and sixteen
(16) are criticality 3/3. The IOA has no issues with the NASA




4.10 Assessment Results - Fo_ard Hotor Control Assemblles
The IOA analysis of the Forward Motor Control Assemblies did not
generate any failure mode worksheets and did not identify any
PCIs before starting the assessment. During the assessment,
three (3) failure mode worksheets were generated which map into
three (3) NASA FMEAs of which none were CILs. The FMEAs are all
criticality 3/3. The IOA has no issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL
reevaluation for these assemblies.
4.11 Assessment Results - AC Generation & Distribution Assemblies
The IOA analysis of the AC Generation and Distribution Assemblies
generated one hundred and ninety-five (195) failure mode
worksheets and identified eighteen (18) PCIs before starting the
assessment. During the assessment, an additional eleven (Ii)
failure mode worksheets were generated. The two hundred and six
(206) IOA worksheets map into twenty-three (23) NASA FMEAs of
which four (4) are CILs. Of the NASA FMEAs, three (3) are
criticality 2/IR, ten (I0) are criticality 3/IR, and ten (i0) are
criticality 3/3. The IOA has no issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL
reevaluation for these assemblies.
4.12 Assessment Results - Flight Deck Panel Controls & Displays
The IOA analysis of the Flight Deck Panel Controls and Displays
generated two hundred and ninety-eight (298) failure mode
worksheets and identified ninety-two (92) PCIs before starting
the assessment. During the assessment, an additional forty-six
(46) failure mode worksheets were generated. The three hundred
and forty-four (344) IOA worksheets map into one hundred and nine
(109) NASA FMEAs of which thirty-seven (37) are CILs. Of the
NASA FMEAs, three (3) are criticality i/I, twenty-three (23) are
criticality 2/IR, thirty-eight (38) are criticality 3/IR, two (2)
are criticality 2/2, four (4) are criticality 3/2R, and
thirty-seven (37) are criticality 3/3. Two (2) NASA FMEAs (05-6-
2237-3 and 05-6-2238-3), criticality 3/IR non-CIL, were not
assessed by the IOA because the FMEA data were not received at
the time of this report. IOA expects to agree with NASA on these
FMEAs. IOA has fourteen (14) worksheets that do not map into the
NASA FMEAs. They are all criticality 3/3 and may be included in
another subsystem, perhaps Displays and Controls. IOA recommends
that these components be added to the FMEA/CIL process, if they






















4.13 Assessment Results - Mid Deok Panel Controls & Displays
The IOA analysis of the Mid Deck Panel Controls and Displays
generated one hundred and twenty-nine (129) failure mode
worksheets and identified forty-eight PCIs before starting the
assessment. During the assessment, an additional seventeen (17)
failure mode worksheets were generated. The one hundred and
forty-six (146) IOA worksheets map into forty-four (44) NASA
FMEAs of which twenty-four (24) are CILs. Of the NASA FMEAs,
sixteen (16) are criticality 2/1R, eight (8) are criticality
3/IR, one (I) is criticality 3/2R, and nineteen (19) are
criticality 3/3. The IOA has no issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL
reevaluation for these assemblies.
4.14 Assessment Results - MECs, ACAs, and Current Sensors
The IOA analysis of the MECs, ACAs, and Current Sensors generated
twenty-three (23) failure mode worksheets and identified four (4)
PCIs before starting the assessment. During the assessment,
seven additional failure mode worksheets were generated. The
thirty (30) IOA worksheets map into twelve (12) NASA FMEAs of
which nine (9) are CILs. Of the NASA FMEAs, one (1) is
criticality 1/1, seven (7) are criticality 2/1R, one (1) is
criticality 3/1R, one (1) is criticality 3/2R, and two (2) are
criticality 3/3. The IOA has no issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL
reevaluation for these assemblies.
4.15 Assessment Results - Why The IOA and The NASA Agree
The IOA has zero (0) real issues with the NASA FMEA/CIL




The IOA analyst was unable to obtaing sufficient data on
Crew and Flight procedures. The specific areas appear in
Appendix F in the resolution codes.
The NSTS 22206 document was revised three or four times
during the analysis and assessment process and the
interpretations of it changed during the process.
Initially, the IOA analyst and the NASA Subsystem Manager
had differing views on the "B" screen detectability issue.
The IOA analyst finally agreed with the NASA argument. Many
FMEAs were upgraded to CIL status due to the interpretation
of the "failures outside the subsystem" rule. The
application of this rule was difficult in the EPD&C
subsystem because it interfaces with every system on the
vehicle (e.g. where does EPD&C stop and another system
begin).
The IOA analyst originally did not believe a power bus (the
wire or copper strip) could be lost with one failure. A






Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
lg VS70-976102 Integrated System Schematic - Electrical
Power Distribution and Control Subsystem, Revision 14,
2 July 1986.
e VS70-948102 Integrated System Schematic - Solid Rocket
Booster Subsystem, Revision 14, 26 September 1985.
• JSC-II174 Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Volumes 1 and
2, Mission Operations Directorate, Systems Division,
Revision C, DCN-5, 13 September 1985.
•
e
VS70-941102 Integrated System Schematic - Main
Propulsion System, Revision E, 26 October 1979.
VS70-943102 Integrated System Schematic - Aft
Propulsion System, OMS/RCS, Revision D08, 20 May 1986.
e VS70-942102 Integrated System Schematic - Forward
Reaction Control System, Revision H02, 19 September
1984.
1 JSC-19041 Shuttle Booster: Master Events Controller
Overview, 1 October 1984.
e SSRI0-26 EPS Bus Loss Listing, Revision 025, 30
September 1985.
e JSC 12820, STS Operational Flight Rules, Final PCN-3,
28 June 1985.
i0. NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, i0 October 1986.
ii. Conversations with W. Stagg/NASA EPD&C Subsystem


































- Annunciator Control Assembly
- Abort Once Around
- Aft Power
- Abort To Orbit
- Critical Items List
- Criticality
- Caution and Warning System
- Direct Current
ECLSS - Environmental Control and Life Support System
EPD&C - Electrical Power Distribution and Control
EPG - Electrical Power Generation
FCP - Fuel Cell Powerplant
FC - Fuel Cell
FMEA - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FSSR - Flight System Software Requirement
GAS - Get Away Special
GPC - General Purpose Computer
GSE - Ground Support Equipment
HDC - Hybrid Driver Controller
Hz - Hertz (cycles per second)
IOA - Independent Orbiter Assessment
MEC - Master Events Controller
MDAC - McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
MDDA - Main DC Distribution Assembly
MDM - Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
MDDC - Main DC Distribution Assembly
MMCA - Mid Motor Control Assembly
MPCA - Mid Power Control Assembly
MPCA - Mid Power Control Assembly
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NA - Not Applicable
NSTS - National Space Transportation System
OF - Operational Forward
OMRSD - Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
PCA - Power Control Assembly
PCI - Potential Critical Item
PLS - Primary Landing Site
PSA - Power Section Assembly
PRCB - Program Requirements Control Board










- Reactant Control Subsystem
- Remote Power Controller
- Return To Landing Site
- Space Transportation System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Thermal Control Subsystem






















Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions











Definitions contained in NSTS 222_06, Instructions2or preDaration
of FMEA/CIL, A0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
_NTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
¢0NTINGENC_ CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
H_GHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and


























MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
_RIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal tomission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
pRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
....: LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE c begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
QNORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
pEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAF_NG PHASE - begins at first main gear












B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
P_eparation of FMEA/CIL. 10 October 1986, was employed with the









The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage Of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings•
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error

































All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure canoccur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to







DEFINITIONSe GROUND RULES, AND _%BSUMPTIONS
EPD&C-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
1. The failure modes of a resistor shorting (e.g. little
or zero resistance) and shorting to ground are not
considered for all resistors in this analysis.
RATIONALE: A shorted resistor will still conduct
current to the connected device. All
Orbiter electrical components in this
subsystem have built-in over-current
protection and will continue to
operate. A resistor shorting to
ground has the same effect as a
resistor opening, that is no current
will be conducted to the rest of the
circuit.
• The failure modes of most switches, relays, power
contactors, hybrid device controllers and remote power
controllers are either a) fails open or off or b) fails
closed or on. The failure modes a) fails to transfer
or b) inadvertent transfer are specified only when the
controlled subsystem functions would be adversely
effected and specifically cause a higher criticality
rating.
RATIONALE: Criticalities are assigned based on
hardware and functional effects. The
major percentage of the above
components are doubly or triply,
redundant in hardware and function.
The functional failure of a component
has more weight in determining its
criticality than the hardware failure.
If a switch fails to transfer or
inadvertently transfers, it is either
failed on and closed or failed off and
open.
• The assumption stated in 22206 that all other
subsystems are operational within specificatlons is not
used in this analysis where one or more failures in



























RATIONALE: Several subsystems in the Orbiter have
never been or are not planned to be
used in the near future during an
actual flight. Examples include but
are not limited to, the BFS, fuel cell
shutdown and restart, DC bus ties, and
RMS jettison. Criticalities are
assigned to the components which
supply and control power to these
functions as if they are required.
All components directly related to fuel cell operation
are assigned criticalities based on only one fuel cell
failing.
RATIONALE: The EPD&C/EPG analysis was conducted
under the assumption that two fuel
cells had already failed. Therefore,
the highest criticalities on fuel cell
operations have already been assigned.










































This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
/
Functional Criticalities: 11
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen





Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2389-4
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C ....
MDAC ID: 5000
ITEM: RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A OFF)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C






































RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A OFF)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[
[
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN A ON)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




















[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS'.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT
INADVERTENT POWERING OF THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS.
w
















SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2048-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER .........
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2350-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K (TO GSE PWR CONT)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C











































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5007
FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ _ ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION AS NASA AGREES THAT THIS
FAILURE IS 1R2 FOR INTACT ABORT.
w
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2008A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 1
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[p] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL _TENTION _TIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_S:
IOA CONCHS WITH T_ NASA _EVALUATION AS NASA AGREES T_T THIS

































NASA [ 3 /3
IOA [ 3 /3 ]













[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2354-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























ASSESSMENT ID: .... _D&C-5011







NEW C x ]





HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2342-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)"
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




















































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2342-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[. / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2336-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2334-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2K I/4W (TO C&W)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2008A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO APCA-4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C N / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION AS NASA AGREES THAT THIS


















FUSE, 200A TO APCA-4




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ....
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IoA CON_S WiTH THE NASA REEVALUATION AS NASA AGREES THAT THIS




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2255-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 5A TO MPCA-I, FPCA-I, APCA-4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5020
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
EPD&C
5021
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LET E )
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA RE-EVALUATION CONCERNING TRANSIENTS
AFFECTING THE GPCS DURING DE-ORBIT. HOWEVER BUS TIE IS FLIGHT
















FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COHPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]..........



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA [ 2 /1R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5025


















(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION AS IOA DID NOT INITIALLY
























ASSESSMENT ID: ;_ EPD&C-5027






FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] *
] C ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2242-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS IBC
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
coMP_ C / ] C ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2253-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2345A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C 1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ..............
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA THAT THIS FAILURE IS i/i FOR RTLS ABORT DUE


































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5031




NASA [ _ /3 ] [ J
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2388A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5033




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2388B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN A)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [NA] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO THIS FAILURE ALONG








































RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:_ _




RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















































RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
E ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] E ] [ ] [































RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS A F/C PWR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO THIS FAILURE ALONG
WITH INADVERTENT POWER ON THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS WOULD DISCONNECT
A MAIN DC BUS FROM THE FUEL CELL. IF A BUS TIE COULD NOT BE






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2207-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5039
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C



















































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N 3 E N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING






















LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[
[














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2207-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] E ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] C ] C ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2207-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5043
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR _] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING
OF THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS.
w
















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
_ELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2207-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]












(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








[ P ] [ NA]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2212-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS OPEN, FAILS CLOSED
IN "OFF" POSITION. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AS THIS









NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2212-2
....NASA DATA: ....
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2212-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE A)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS CLOSED IN "ON"













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2211-1
NASA DATA: :
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC/MN BUS A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MOD E AS: _FAILS TO TRANSFER TO
":6FF'_, _ SHORTS=TO GROUND, FAILS CLOSED IN "ON". IOA CONCURS WITH































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5050











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS CLOSED IN "OFF"
POSITION. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND AGREES THAT



















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
CO_PARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5051






















(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2241-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN A CONTR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] E ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.










































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )

































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


















































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2263-i
NASA DATA: ....
BASELI_ [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN A CONTR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2263-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN A CONTR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C











































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO AFTER LEARNING MORE
INFO_TION ABOUT EMERGENCY _CTIONS.
m
i














NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO AFTER LEARNING MORE
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2278-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASAIS REEVALUATION DUE TO AFTER LEARNING MORE









NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2280-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







FUSE, 15A TO A6A1 PANEL (FUSE 8) & A14 PANEL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2601-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5064
ITEM: FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO MN A CONT BUS PWR, ESS
BUS SOURCE 3AB,ESS BUS SOURCE 2CA




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5065
FUSE, 5A TO RMS PWR (FUSE 1),RMS HTRS
(RESISTORS) & RJDA MANF DRS (FUSES 9 & 12)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2181-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BCl)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:









NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2181-2
N_A DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC1)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [







COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2181-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.
IOA CONCURS.
i







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2181-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC2)




HDW/FUNC -A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2181-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS BC3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2181-2
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2225-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2225-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5074




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ J
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ J [ ]
[ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [





























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















































NEW [ X ]






NaSa [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]









NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2263-2
NASA DATA:







CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN C CONTR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






















NASA FMEA # : 05-6-2247-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN A UTIL PWR 019/M052J)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2247-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN A UTIL PWR 019/M052J)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] C
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] C








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5080
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS BCI, BC2, BC3)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If_differ_nt from NASA)-
, [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASAIS REEVALUATION AS A CIRCUIT BREAKER "POP"


















CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS BCI, BC2, BC3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (I_ different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2703-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA
OPERATIONAL STATUS MEASUREMENTS AND THE CREW CAN MONITER THE
MOTOR OPERATION TIME.



























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2653-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID 1)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER .....
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] E ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AS IOA WAS UNAWARE OF THE
"PSYCHOTIC GPC" CONCERN.- ......
=
















SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID I)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ _ _i
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: ......
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2006-1
NASA DATA: __
BASELINE [ ]







FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-1
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)






































FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-I





NASA [ 3 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w


















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5088




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































RPC, 5A (FMCA-I PWR CONT)





_ _z_:_ _ _:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















RPC, 5A (FMCA-1 PWR CONT)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B". GROUND CAN DETERMINE STATE





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]




[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2006-1
NASA DATA:

















[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [







































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA) _
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























RESISTOR, 5.1K TO TEST POINTS




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS COMPONENT HAS NO CONNECTION TO FLIGHT HARDWARE OR IS A TEST


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2351-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



























NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C
5096




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
C ] C ] C ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S EVALUATION BECAUSE THE IOA ANALYST WAS
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2707-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-1)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
m
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2707-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] ....






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2657-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A FWD i)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ]. [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:























NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5099




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C










































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]








[ P ] [ e ]
[P] [P]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER EXAMINATION OF
THE CIRCUIT. THIS FUSE IS ACTUALLY 100 AMPS WITH THE













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2354-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
.[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-I)





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B- C
[ F ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
. (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA - IOA UNAWARE OF "PSYCHOTIC GPC" PROBLEM.
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2803-1
NASA DATA: ......
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A - B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2299-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE[ ]

















NASA [ 3 /1R ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS • (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2299-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 50A TO H2/02 HTR CONT ASSY #3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2010-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 150A TO APCA-I




HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] EN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] E ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























FUSE, 100A TO ALCA-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
CP] CP] [P]
[p] IF] IF]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IoAcONCURS WITH NASAREEVALUATION FOR NOMINAL FLIGHT AND WE B_TH















































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5108




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ 1






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2701-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE )
* CIL RETENTION _TIONA_: (If applicable[ _t_ _ ....
ADEQUATE [ X ]
....... INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA


















































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5109




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2651-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A AFT i)





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]








[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


















































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5111




NASa [ _ /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ 2 [ 2
[ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2801-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5112
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-I)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE RPC

























RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-1)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C




















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5114
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-1)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2704-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-1)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA: .............
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5115

















[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2654-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN A MID 3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2804-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5117
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)










[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ /N ] [N] [N] [N] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:












































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ _ , _ ,i-;_ _._ -ADEQUATE [ X ]


















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5119










NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B OFF)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If_different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















ASSES S_-/_ ID: EPD&C-5121






RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B ON)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]











[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN B ON)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 1 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT













































[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
(If different from'NASA)
[ I ] C
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2048-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA AFTER FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE CIRCUIT.
























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION FOR THE REASONS LISTED IN




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2008B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION FOR THE REASONS LISTED IN
THE FMEA/CIL. SCREEN "C" DIFFERENCE WAS A TYPO.
w






















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2350-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2354-1
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2354-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2336-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] E ]
[ ] [ 3






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / 3 C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2342-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2334-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2K I/4W (TO C&W)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )








































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C
5136
SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C 2)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA DUE TO A CHANGE IN NSTS 22206 CONCERNING
HAZARDS TO POPULATION FROM THE EXTERNAL TANK.
w
l











FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )



































FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2242-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS 2CA









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[p] [P] [P]
[p] [F] [P]






(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ]





FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS
K. SCHMECKPEPER






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































FUSE, 150A TO DC TIE BUS







NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B".
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2255-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 5A TO MPCA-2, FPCA-2, APCA-5







NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2008B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO APCA-5




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION FOR THE REASONS LISTED IN
THE FMEA/CIL. SCREEN "C" DIFFERENCE WAS A TYPO.
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2008B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO APCA-5
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION FOR THE REASONS LISTED IN



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2004-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2004-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA RE-EVALUATION CONCERNING TRANSIENTS
AFFECTING THE GPCS DURING DE-ORBIT. HOWEVER BUS TIE IS FLIGHT



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION AS IOA DID NOT INITIALLY
CONSIDER THE LOSS OF AN ESSENTIAL BUS AS A SINGLE FAILURE.
w
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [ P] [ p] [ x] *
[P] [P] [p] [x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS •

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA THAT THIS FAILURE IS i/i FOR RTLS ABORT.
w
r






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)








NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
C P ] [F] CP] IX]*
[P] [P] [P] [ ]










(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION AS IOA DID NOT INITIALLY



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2004-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:






IOA CONCURS WITH NASA RE-EVALUATION CONCERNING TRANSIENTS
AFFECTING THE GPCSDURING DE'ORBIT. HOWEVER BUS TIE IS FLIGHT
RULED OUT DURING ASCENT.
w
















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5155
SWITCH, MOTORIZED (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2388A-2
NASA DATA:
--BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (ifdifferent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2388A-I
NASA DATA:
_ELINE [ ]






RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
T_AD ANALYST: K. SC_ECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / ] i ] c ] c ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2388B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2388B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN B)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO THIS FAILURE ALONG





































HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)


























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C
5163
RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS B F/C PWR)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] C ] C ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO THIS FAILURE ALONG
WITH INADVERTENT POWER ON THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS WOULD DISCONNECT
A MAIN DC BUS FROM THE FUEL CELL. IF A BUS TIE COULD NOT BE


































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING
OF THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS.
I
























NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )





































NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING


















NASA _A #: 05-6-2207-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
























HDW/_NC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )













































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING
OF THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS.
w
w



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2207-2
NASA DATA: ........_
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2263-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN B CONTR)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO FUEL CELL SAFING
CONCERNS.
m





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2263-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (MN B CONTR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2241-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN B CONTR)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )























NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5175
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN B CONTR)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)















































NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: "(If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA AFTER LEARNING OF THE FUEL CELL SAFING
CONCERNS.
=_














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2184-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA AFTERFURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE CIRCUIT.
B




















NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:




































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS OPEN, FAILS CLOSED
IN "OFF" POSITION. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AS THIS
IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.
w
J
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]










[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
_ _ INADEQUATE [ ]







































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5181






HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA_S REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS CLOSED IN "ON"











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2211-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]














HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .........
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NAS A HAS REDEFiNED_ THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FA!_ TO_!_SFER TO
"OFF" SHORTS TO GROUND, FAILS CLOSED IN "ON" IOA CONCURS WITH

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2211-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC/MN BUS B)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
=
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS CLOSED IN "OFF"
POSITION. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND AGREES THAT



















SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2228-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN B)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS

















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5185
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN B)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
CP] CP] [P]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C














































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [






















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]

























] [ ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO AFTER LEARNING MORE











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2278-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_S:
I0A CON_S WITH NASA'S REEVALUA_ON DUE TOAFTER LEARNING MORE



































NASA FMEA #: NEW # UNKNOWN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 10A TO RMS PWR & RJDA




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [. ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























BUSSES IBC & 3AB
EPD&C
5193
FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO CONT BUS PWR MN B, ESS





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2280-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _ .
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ Y ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
. ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA_CONgURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO AFTER LEARNING MORE
INFORMATION ABOUT E_RGENCY _IONS. .... _
m
J

















NASA FME #: 05-6-2278-1
...."ASADA A:ii
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO AFTER LEARNING MORE
INFORMATION ABOUT EMERGENCY FUNCTIONS.
u
m





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2247-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (MN B UTIL PWR F1/M013Q)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2247-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If_different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AS A CIRCUIT BREAKER "POP"






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2261-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS CA1, CA2, CA3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER ....
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS - CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2225-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5203




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2225-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN B)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2707-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-2)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2707-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
I0A [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ !






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2657-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B FWD 2)





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2657-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B FWD 2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C















































FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2








[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2006-1
NASA DAT_A: ..........
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-2





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[p] IF]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [






















































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5211




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )


















RPC, 5A (FMCA-2 PWR CONT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]

























[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) _
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B". GROUND CAN DETERMINE STATE
OF RPC VIA OPERATIONAL STATUS MEASUREMENTS.
m
w






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable) _





































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2006-1
NASA DATA: _.......
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 2





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2294-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-2





NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S EVALUATION BECAUSE THE IOA ANALYST WAS
UNAWARE OF THE SINGLE STRING FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM.

















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
....... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS COMPONENT HAS NO CONNECTION TO FLIGHT HARDWARE OR IS A TEST
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2351-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO SIG COND OF2)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2705-1
NASA DATA:
...._BA-SELINE [ ] _







RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
K. SCm CXPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE SeA






































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5220




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2655-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA
































SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID i)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B • C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2703-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2703-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2653-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 2)









HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /1R ] C P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ x ] ,
C 2 /1R] C P ] C F] [ P ] [ x]
C / ] [ ] CN] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) .................
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
TH_ __fB_S_RE_-NPASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2653-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 2)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AS IOA WAS UNAWARE OF THE
"PSYCHOTIC GPC" CONCERN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2705-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5226
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)





NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ]












[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2705-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C : : _ :
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
iOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2655-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA
OPERATIONAL STATUS MEASUREMENTS AND THE CREW CAN MONITER THE
MOTOR OPERATION TIME.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2703-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_NC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE '_B_ SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2703-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-2)









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2653-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 4)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] C P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





















































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5231
SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B MID 4)
K. sc n C PEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA
OPERATIONAL STATUS MEASUREMENTS AND THE CREW CAN MONITER THE
MOTOR OPERATION TIME.
w












FUSE, 100A TO MPCA-2








C 2 IIR ] C P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /1R ] C P ] C P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)_ ......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:










































RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(if different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















_ _ RPC, 5A (TO .__MMCA-I) _





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]










] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-1)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]




[ p ] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RY__-
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
L
















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C
5236
RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
NASA DATA: ;_;_ ;_;
BASELINE[ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C i
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) - _; ,;
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
















































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2805-1
NASA DATA:






RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA C 2 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] C P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
REDUND_CY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)._____ ...........






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2805-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE _[ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




[ ] C ] C ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ....................
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:








































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
REDUNDANCYsCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )














NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2299-1
.NASA DATA: ..........
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [











































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2299-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #3









NASA [ 3 /IR ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] CN] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (if different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2299-1
NASA..DAT_A: .....
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 50A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #4





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







































FUSE, 150A TO APCA-2





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























FUSE, IOOA TO ALCA-2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2351-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, I.SK I/4W (TO SIG COND OA2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
..... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
m





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2701-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-5)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2701-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
*
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2651-1
NASA DATA: : __
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B AFT 2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2651-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN B AFT 2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-2)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKSz
THE "B" SC_EN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE RPC
STATE WITH THE MCA OPERATIONAL STATUS MEASUREMENT.











RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-2)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2333-1
NASA DAT_:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B".














NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5253
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L AUX BUS - MPCA-1)






HDW/FUNC A B C
] *
]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
. (ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2333-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L AUX BUS - MPCA-2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L AUX BUS - MPCA-2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE E / ] E ] [ ] E ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] E ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2333-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L CABIN BUS - MPCA-2)





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2333-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2333-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L CABIN BUS - MPCA-I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2333-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO P/L CABIN BUS - MPCA-1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] E ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ .[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


























SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (PAYLOAD AUX)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [






] [ ] C ] [ ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS" TO THIS FMEA. IOA

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2234-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (PAYLOAD AUX)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY RED_DANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.


















SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD CABIN)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C .....
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.......... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS" TO THIS FMEA. IOA




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2233-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD CABIN)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2326-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF4)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT'.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2326-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF4)









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE E / ] E ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] E ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2326-1
NASA DATA: .......
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2394-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
i
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2394-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES




HDW/FUNC A B C _ _ _
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I0A [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ], [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2395-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2395-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5267
ITEM: RPC, !5A TO PAYLOAD CABIN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C N ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


















RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN











NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ADD/DELETE)

























RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
















] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ] -
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If_different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]








































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2322-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.8K (TO MDM OF1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2321-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2.2K (TO MDM OF1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B".
C ]
[ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ _ = ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF
THE CIRCUIT.
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
: . (ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF
THE CIRCUIT.
u

















DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)








NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [NA] [P] [ ]*
[P] [F] [P] [X]









(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5283
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
- (ADD/DELETE)















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO PAYLOAD CABIN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] C ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN





NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE E / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] E ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] E ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] E ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2395-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 15A TO PAYLOAD CABIN




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2394-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2394-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 20A TO P/L AUX & P/L EMERGENCY BUSSES
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2322-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.8K (TO MDM OF2)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2321-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2.2K (TO MDM OF2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2396-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE_[ ]






RPC, 7.5A (P/L PWR KILL MAIN B/C)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (ifdifferent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ c_ (ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER LEARNING MORE ABOUT
PAYLOAD POWER REQUIREMENTS.
w














RPC, 7.5A (P/L PWR KILL MAIN B/C)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT _ ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2209-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2 -




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B".
[ ]
[ ]















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5299
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #2 -
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(AD D/DE LETE )




NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.



































DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3 -




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO FUEL CELL SAFING
CONCERNS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2209-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY #3 -




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2210-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO P/L PWR KILL - FC#3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA RE-EVALUATION AS IOA WAS UNAWARE OF NSTS
PROGRAM POLICY NOT TO SUPPLY PAYLOAD POWER DIRECTLY FROM FUEL
CELL 3.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/_C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.




















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2397-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 7.5A (P/L PWR KILL F/C#3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2397-2
NASA DATA: .......






RPC, 7o5A (P/L PWR KILL F/C#3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS
TO OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2227-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2227-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: SHORTS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.















SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI F/C#3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ .] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAIL TO TRANSFER, FAILS





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2226-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI F/C#3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2226-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI F/C#3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS CLOSED IN "ON"



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2227-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN C)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
=
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_- _ ,_ _ (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ _ ADEQUATE [ ]
......... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS
TO OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION.
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2227-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD PRI MN C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: SHORTS. IOA CONCURS
WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION, _
L
u






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2141-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B TO PAYLOAD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2141-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS B TO PAYLOAD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2323-1
NASA DATA:_
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO MDM OF3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] C ] *
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2606-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 150A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3 (PAYLOAD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF
THE CIRCUIT.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2606-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [NA] [P] [ ]*
[P] [F] [P] [X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (_I{-a-p_icable) .... _ _!__ _i! _i
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2240-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC 3 STRUCT RTN)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
w RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER LEARNING OF MCRII954.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2240-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC 3 STRUCT RTN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER LEARNING OF MCRII954.
W
m i






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2240-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (FC 3 STRUCT RTN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER LEARNING OF MCRII954.
L



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If-different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2606-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 150A TO PAYLOAD
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF
THE CIRCUIT.
u






NASA FMEA # : 05-6-2289-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE_)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER EXAMINATION OF






























FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD











N_A [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [X]*
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER EXAMINATION OF
THE CIRCUIT. IOA DID NOT CONSIDER A SINGLE STRING POWERED
PAYLOAD.
u





















[2/2 ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]




IOA CONCURS WiTH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER _THER EXAMINATION OF
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2289-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [







FUSE, 200A TO PAYLOAD
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUnDAnCY -SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER EXAMINATION OF





















NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2324-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] C ] *
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
EPD&C-5328
05-6-2323-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5328








C ] C ]
C ] C ]








(If different from NASA)
C ] [ ] C [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5329




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2208-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)












NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2208-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5332




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2208-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO DC RETURN FROM P/L BAY)








NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ]
[NA] [P] [X]*
[F] [P] [X]
[N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2140-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 TO PAYLOAD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] C ] [ N ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2140-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 TO PAYLOAD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
i
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA AFTER LEARNING OF THE FUEL CELL SAFING
CONCERNS.






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2142-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 STRUCTURE RETURN)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE TO "FAILS OPEN" - IOA
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2142-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (F/C 3 STRUCTURE RETURN)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE TO "FAILS CLOSED" - IOA
CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUTION.






NASA FME #: 05-6-2141-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (MAIN DC BUS C TO PAYLOAD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2141-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C OFF)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] •
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C ON)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] .
] C ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






























RPC, 7.5A (GSE MAIN C ON)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [F] [P]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT
INADVERTENT POWERING OF THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS.
=
h


















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5344




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2048-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, MOTORIZED (GSE PWR CONTROL)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2008C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2008C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO MAIN DC DIST ASSY 3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF
THE CIRCUIT. SCREEN "C" DIFFERENCE WAS A TYPO.























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2350-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K (TO GSE PWR CONT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA # : 05-6-2354-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2342-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

















































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5353




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] C ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































RESISTOR, 2K 1/4W (TO C&W)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
.... (ADD/DELETE)


























NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ]



























ASSESSMENT iD: _ _ EPD&C-5357
NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2345C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SHUNT, DC AMMETER (TO F/C 3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASATHAT THIS FAILURE IS 1/1 FOR RTLS ABORT DUE
TO HELIUM BLOWDOWN VALVES FAILURE AND PROBLEMS WITH OMS FUEL
DUMP.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2008C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO APCA-6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ......
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION AFTER _ _ALYSIS OF


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2008C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO APCA-6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
m
r
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF
THE CIRCUIT. SCREEN "C" DIFFERENCE WAS A TYPO.
u






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2255-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 5A TO MPCA-3, FPCA-3, APCA-6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2260-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















FUSE, 200A TO DC TIE BUS







[ 3 /IR ] [ P] [ NA]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS:" (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





































FUSE, 10A (NO LOAD CONNECTED)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS COMPONENT HAS NO CONNECTION TO FLIGHT HARDWARE OR IS A TEST
POINT. THEREFORE NASA DID NOT INCLUDE IT IN THEIR FMEAS. IOA
CONCURS.
w











FUSE, 20A TO ESS BUS 3AB





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [








































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] •
3 [ ]
] [ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















FUSE, 3A TO DC VOLTMETER
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[
[
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2241-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A THERMAL (MAIN C CONTR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B".
[ ]
[ ]


















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5368







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from °NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2212-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS OPEN, FAILS CLOSED
IN "OFF" POSITION. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AS THIS
IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2212-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2212-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (MAIN BUS TIE C)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS CLOSED IN "ON"
POSITION, SHORTS (CONTACT TO CONTACT). IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S
REEVALUATION.
i














SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (FC/MN BUS C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
- ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS TO TRANSFER TO _._
"OFF" SHORTS TO GROUND, FAILS CLOSED IN "ON". IOA CONCURS WITH
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2211-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE DPDT (FC/MN BUS C)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS CLOSED IN "OFF"
POSITION. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND AGREES THAT
THIS FAILURE IS CRIT 1 DURING INTACT ABORT.
=














SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA HAS REDEFINED THIS FAILURE MODE AS: FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS




















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2228-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN C)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS
COMPONENT. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S ANALYSIS.
l
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2228-2
_NASA DATA :t.......






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPDT (PAYLOAD AFT MN C)










[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]




COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If dif_fen_ _from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA _S REDEFINED _THIS FAILURE MODE AS: SHORTS. IOA CONCURS






































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2392-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RELAY (TO AFT PAYLOAD BUS)









NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] C ] *
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [









































NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]










] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2388A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
J
u
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2388A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS'. (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2388B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY '_ RED_D_C¥ SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















RPC, 7.5A (DC TIE BUS MAIN C)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO THIS FAILURE ALONG























RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









































RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






























RPC, 7.5A (MAIN DC BUS C F/C PWR)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO THIS FAILURE ALONG
WITH INAD_RTENT PO_RON THE P_FLIGHT TEST BUS WOULD DISCONNECT
A MAIN DC BUS_?ROM THE FUEL CELL. IF A BUS TIE COULD NOT BE


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2207-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
C ] C ] C ]
CN] CN] CN]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING
OF THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C ....
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) _:_- i_,_ _ _ _
ADEQUATE [ ]
_ - INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : .....
  CO CER S ABOUT




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2207-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER L
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICAL_ RED_DANCY S CRE_S
FLIGHT
HDW/_C _ A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS". (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)





































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)







NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM

















































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING
OF THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA_0NCURS W_T_NASADUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2207-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /IR ]









COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO FUEL CELL SAFING CONCERNS.










NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5394
ITEM: DIODE, ISOLATION 35A
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
RE DUN DANC-Y SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO AFTER LEARNING MORE
INFORMATION ABOUT EMERGENCY FUNCTIONS.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ S /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO AFTER LEARNING MORE

















NASA FMEA #: NEW # UNKNOWN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5397
ITEM: FUSE, 5A TO RJDA





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2280-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 15A TO AI4 PANEL (RCS/OMS HTRS)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER :_::
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




























BUSSES IBC & 2CA
EPD&C
5399
FUSE, 5A TO RESISTORS TO CONT BUS MAIN C, ESS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B".
C ]
C ]
















[ / ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WIRING CHANGE HAS DISCONNECTED THIS FUSE FROM ALL LOADS.
THEREFORE, NASA HAS DELETED THIS FMEA NUMBER.
B
D



















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
























NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION DUE TO AFTER LEARNING MORE

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2247-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2247-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2261-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS ABI, AB2, AB3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C
5406
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 10A (CONT BUS ABI, AB2, AB3)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AS A CIRCUIT BREAKER "POP"


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2181-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS ABI)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.
IOA CONCURS.
i-





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2181-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB1)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)














































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5409




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2181-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2181-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIODE, ISOLATION 12A (TO CONT BUS AB3)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY _ REDUND_CY_SCREENS _ CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE
[p] [F] [P] [X] *
[P] [F] [P] [X]
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.
IOA CONCURS.
















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5412




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
[ ] [ ]
































SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2225-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)


































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2225-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)























NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5416




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2225-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2225-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE (DC UTIL PWR MN C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2707-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] C ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:








NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2707-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO FPCA-3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C FWD 3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / _ [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
i RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2657-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C FWD 3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE -[ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:












































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







FUSE, 150A TO FPCA-3
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY -- -REDUNDANCY SCREENS ......
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fr6m NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2354-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























ASSESSMENT ID: " EPD&C-5426













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASAIS SCREEN "B". GROUND CAN DETERMINE STATE
OF RPC VIA OPERATIONAL STATUS MEASUREMENTS.











FUSE, 35A TO FLCA-3




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA'S EVALUATION BECAUSE THE IOAANALYST WAS






























NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS COMPONENT HAS NO CONNECTION TO FLIGHT HARDWARE OR IS A TEST
POINT. THEREFORE NASA DID NOT INCLUDE IT IN THEIR FMEAS. IOA
CONCURS.














RESISTOR, 1.8K i/4W (TO SIG COND OF3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2704-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
w
B
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2704-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






_SISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-3)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
_COMMENDATIONS: (If different fr0m NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DET _TE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2703-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-3)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2703-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO MPCA-3)









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2654-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 2)








NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ p] [p] [p] IX] *
[P] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] IN] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA
OPERATIONAL STATUS MEASUREMENTS AND THE CREW CAN MONITER THE
MOTOR OPERATION TIME.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2654-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA _IC MN C MID 2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2653-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
F
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2653-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C MID 4)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:





























FUSE, 100A TO MPCA-3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER EXAMINATION OF
THE CIRCUIT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2354-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO GSE MONITOR)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)




































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2299-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 35A TO H2/02 HTR CONT ASSY #i




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
r
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :











NASA FMEA # : 05-6-2299-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 35A TO H2/O2 HTR CONT ASSY #2









NASA [ 3 /IR ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2299-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-2)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
• [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS- o
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w











RPC, 5A (TO MMCA-4)














[3/3 ] [ ]
[F] [P] [X]*
[ ] [ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]




















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2803-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




















[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C / ] C ] C ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from_NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
1











FUSE, 150A TO APCA-3





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ !


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2293C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 100A TO ALCA-3
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[P] [Y] [F]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2351-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.8K I/4W (TO SIG COND OA3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












































NASA FMEA # : 05-6-2701-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-6)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE MCA










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2701-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-6)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2651-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (MCA LOGIC MN C AFT 3)








NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[p] [p] [p] IX] *
[P] [F] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE CREW CAN MONITER THE MOTOR
OPERATION TIME.
=





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2651-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




































RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-3)











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
.... ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE "B" SCREEN PASSES BECAUSE THE GROUND CAN MONITER THE RPC
STATE WITH THE MCA OPERATIONAL STATUS MEASUREMENT.
U













RPC, 5A (TO AMCA-3)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2331-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 1BC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B".
[ ]
[ ]













NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5454




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ / ]
(If different from NASA)
CIL
ITEM
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2214-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN B/C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN B/C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2331-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B".
[ ]
[ ]
















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5457
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W TO MDM OF4
K. SCHMECKPEPER
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2213-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / "] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2213-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C I)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE " [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
......... ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND - FUEL CELL TO









































NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5459




[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]







[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2335-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [

































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5461




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ 3 [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2339-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5463








[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [

















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2187-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-2 - ESS BUS IBC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ Y ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCENARIO LISTED ON THE CIL, BUT CONSIDERS
THIS TO BE AN "INCREDIBLE" CREDIBLE SET OF FAILURES.




















NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 10A TO MDCA #1 - ESS BUS 1BC




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [" ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I 1 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2011-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)









NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 10A TO MDCA #1 - ESS BUS 1BC









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]










[ / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If different from NASA)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2338-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.8K 1/4W (TO MDM OF3)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2339-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2.2K i/2W (TO MDM OF3)









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2187-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-3 - ESS BUS IBC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2187-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-3 - ESS BUS 1BC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen£ from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )










































LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[F] [F] [P]
[ ] C ] C ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCENARIO LISTED ON THE CIL, BUT CONSIDERS
THIS TO BE AN "INCREDIBLE" CREDIBLE SET OF FAILURES.
u














NASA [ 3 /3 j
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
















c ] c ]*
[ ] [ ]
[ ] c ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) _
C / ] C ] C ] C ]






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2185-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS IBC)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2185-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 1BC)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY sCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
........ ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.



































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5479
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 1BC)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[x] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION DUE TO FUEL CELL SAFING
CONCERNS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2186-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 1BC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )


































DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 1BC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
L_
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2186-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]

















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2186-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 1BC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






REPORT DATE 02/23/88 C-529













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA _T_
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5482




[ P ] [ F ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION DUE TO FUEL CELL SAFING
CONCERNS.










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2185-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS




.DW/nmc _ B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HASADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.









NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2185-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS IBC
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]


















































NASA [ 3 /IR ]




FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS IBC
K. SCHMECKPEPER
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5488








NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C

































FUSE, 15A TO APCA-4











NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
w
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF
THE CIRCUIT.
u





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2300-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
































FUSE, 10A TO ML86B PANEL





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















FUSE, 15A TO MPCA-I











NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:


































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2275-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 10A TO FPCA-I & FLCAI




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)













































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASAIS SCREEN "B".
[x]
[ ]
































RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO ESS 1BC MONITOR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS COMPONENT HAS NO CONNECTION TO FLIGHT HARDWARE OR IS A TEST
POINT. THEREFORE NASA DID NOT INCLUDE IT IN THEIR FMEAS. IOA
CONCURS.
v











RPC, 15A (TO ESS BUS 1BC)





NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [











































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2335-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS 1BC VOLTAGE)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [



































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]




















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2191-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS IBC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2191-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 1BC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5503
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 1BC)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING


































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5504
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS IBC)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEMFLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING
OF THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS.
w







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2191-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 1BC)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_ r





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2482-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS IBC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2482-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS IBC)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
.... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS COMPONENT HAS NO CONNECTION TO FLIGHT HARDWARE OR IS A TEST




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2702-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-5)






HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ " (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2702-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO APCA-5)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2652-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 1/2)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ I ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2652-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 1/2)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2802-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2802-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C _.__
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
EPD&C-5514
05-6-2902-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5514


















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) __ _























NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5515
DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] E
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS. •
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "A". THE REVISED OMRSD PROCEDURES
WILL DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE.
=























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ]





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
..... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "A". THE REVISED OMRSD PROCEDURES















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)









NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS BC BUS)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] C F ]
[P] [F]
























RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2214-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN C/A)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS" (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
















NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5518


















(If different from NASA)
] C ] [ ] C




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2214-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE MAIN C/A)








NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2331-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W (TO ESS BUS 2CA)






NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























ASSESSMENT ID: " EPD&C-5521
NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2331-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /iR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[P] [P] [P] [ ]*
[p] IF] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] IN] [ ] [N]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] E ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















BASELINE [ ]-T_; _
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5522 --
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W TO MDM OF4




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA -[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2335-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
C ] C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
EPD&C-5524
05-6-2213-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5524



























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
......... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND - FUEL CELL TO



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2213-2
NASA DATA-
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE 3PDT (ESS BUS SOURCE F/C 2)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)




















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5525




HDW/FUNC A B C
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]















(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ]





























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

















NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
K. SCHMECKPEPER • _c_-_
ASSESSMENT:
_ITICALITY _D_DANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] CF] [P]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
...... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCENARIO LISTED ON THE CIL, BUT CONSIDERS






























NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5528




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2187-1
NASA DATA: =
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2338-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [




COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FME #: 05-6-2339-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF3)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




















RPC, 10A TO MDCA #2 - ESS BUS 2CA









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
•(ADD/DELETE)




















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: {If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)











NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2011-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 10A TO MDCA #2 - ESS BUS 2CA




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5536




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





















RESISTOR, 2.2K 1/2W (TO MDM OF2)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [





















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2187-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-I - ESS BUS 2CA)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY .... REDUNDANCY SCREENS .......... CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2187-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION (TO MPCA-I - ESS BUS 2CA)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

































LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCENARIO LISTED ON THE CIL, BUT CONSIDERS
THIS TO BE AN "INCREDIBLE" CREDIBLE SET OF FAILURES.
















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [



































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5542






[ ] [ ]
(If different from NASA)
[ ] [ ] [













ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2185-2
NASA DATA:
BASEL_ [ ]







DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO RIAI PANEL - ESS BUS
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If appiicable) _ _ _i_i
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS : _:_: _ :_
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.










































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C
5544
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2186-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)


















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2186-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)










NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2186-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
R_COMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)























NASA FMEA #: -_05-6-2186-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2186-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER ......
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
..... ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2185-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
K. SCHMECKPEPER _ T
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS ADDED THE FAILURE MODE "SHORTS TO GROUND" TO THIS FMEA.
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA REEVALUATION DUE TO FUEL CELL SAFING
CONCERNS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2185-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (ESS BUS 2CA)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY _DUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
.... [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)



























FUSE, 10A TO ESS BUS 2CA





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w






















NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)






























NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA # : 05-6-2256-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FUSE, 3A TO SIG COND/MDM MONITOR









NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [








































FUSE, 15A TO APCA-5




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY _DUNDANCY SCREENS ..... CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF
THE CIRCUIT.
w
















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [






































NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


















FUSE, 15A TO MPCA-2





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:































FUSE, 10A TO FPCA-2 & FLCA-2





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]



















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B".
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]







































RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
































NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "B".
[x]
[ ]














RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W (TO ESS 2CA MONITOR)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If d_fferent_from_NASA) =
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS COMPONENT HAS NO CONNECTION TO FLIGHT HARDWARE OR IS A TEST

































RESISTOR, 5.1K (ESS BUS 2CA TEST POINT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS COMPONENT HAS NO CONNECTION TO FLIGHT HARDWARE OR IS A TEST
POINT. THEREFORE NASA DID NOT INCLUDE IT IN THEIR FMEAS. IOA
CONCURS.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2482-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS 2CA)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] C ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If _dlfferent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)






























NASA _ #: 05-6-2482-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HYBRID DRIVER TYPE I (ESS BUS 2CA)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)


























NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














































NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)












NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2191-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]




] [ ] C ] [
] C ] [ ] [









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2191-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2191-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
..... C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING





















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5569
DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)
K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT INADVERTENT POWERING
OF THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS.
g _





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2191-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS BUS 2CA)









NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] [ ] [ ] C
C ] C ] [ ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:

































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2191-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, ISOLATION 35A (TO ESS _BUS 2CA)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)






















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2335-1
NASA DATA: .........
BASELINE [_ ] ..........













NASA [ 3 /3 ]












] [ ] •
] C ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








































FUSE, 7.5A TO ALCA-2 (MPS)
LEAD ANALYST: K. SCHMECKPEPER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] C ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)


















NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
EPD&C-5573
05-6-2702-1
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5573























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [



















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2702-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)














NASA FMEA #: 0516-2652-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SWITCH, TOGGLE SPST (AFT POD VLV LOGIC GRP 2/3)




HDW/FUNC A _ B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)












































NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5575




NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]








RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)



















RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)







[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [







[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2802-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)





















NEW [ X ]
EPD&C
5578 c_




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)




















NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]















DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASAWS SCREEN "A". THE REVISED OMRSD PROCEDURES



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "A". THE REVISED OMRSD PROCEDURES
WILL DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)




























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS CA BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)








NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPA_Z [ / ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[P] [F] [P] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS. " (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)



























NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)







NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-2
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "A". THE REVISED OMRSD PROCEDURES



































NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-2
NASA DATA:
- BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
....- = (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ................
ADEQUATE [ X ]
- INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S SCREEN "A". THE REVISED OMRSD PROCEDURES
WILL DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2902-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]







RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)



















NASA FMEA #: 05"6-2902-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE, 12A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]






NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2802-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5586 ....
ITEM: RPC, 5A (TO RCS/OMS AB BUS)









NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[P] [F] [P]
[P] IF] [P]















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
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